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the same rationale. The rationale most in accord with insurance
jurisprudence, and one easily and logically applied, is that which
declares the interest to vest at the time of the formation of the
contract. This is the life insurance rule, which, since it is well
settled and understood by the bench and bar, would minimize
error in application. Because workmen's compensation and un-
employment compensation are founded on statute, and not con-
tract, another rule can logically be maintained.
The writer is of the opinion that these two types of insur-
ance are so obviously a substitute for wages that they should be
treated as such, and their character be determined as of the time
the right to benefits arises.
William L. McLeod, Jr.
Real Estate Brokerage in Louisiana
The frequency with which real estate brokers must resort to
the courts for enforcement of compensative claims has created a
major source of litigation. The purpose of this Comment is to
make a short survey of the jurisprudence and operative legal
principles involved in that litigation in Louisiana. The writer
does not purport to survey all of the various exceptions and con-
tradictions which have been created, but rather to afford a gen-
eral discussidn of the more important developments in this area
of the law. There are various types of transactions which the
broker might effect for his principal. However, for convenience,
where the rules and principles are general this discussion will
be in terms of sale.
Statutory Regulations
A real estate broker is statutorily defined as any person who,
for compensation, "sells or offers for sale, buys or offers to buy,
or negotiates the purchase or sale or exchange of real estate, or
who leases or offers to lease, or rents or offers to rent, any real
estate or the improvements thereon for others as a vocation."1
Real estate salesmen 2 are merely employees of brokers and are
prohibited by statute from accepting commissions for the per-




formance of their functions from any person other than the
licensed brokers by whom they are employed." For that reason
this Comment will be concerned primarily with the real estate
broker: the person actually involved in litigation concerning com-
pensation for brokerage acts.
It is expressly stated in the statutes that no person is to
engage in the business of a real estate salesman or broker unless
he has obtained a license.4 However, a person who procures for
another a purchaser in one isolated instance has been held not
engaged in such business as a partial vocation and hence not re-
quired to have a license. 5 The sanctions imposed for violations
of the lidensing requirement are two-fold: first, a fine of not
more than $2,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than two
years, or both,6 and second, forfeiture of the violator's right to
use the courts of the state to enforce his claim for compensation
arising from the brokerage. 7
A real estate broker's license may be obtained by any person
who has resided in this state for a period of six months or longer
and who can satisfy the qualifications of a good reputation for
honesty and fairness, attested to by at least two citizen land-
owners of the parish or city in which the applicant resides.8 A
written application for the license must be submitted to the
Louisiana Real Estate Board.9 The Board has the power to re-
fuse issuance of a license in the absence of any satisfactory
proof which it might require in reference to the honesty, truth-
fulness, reputation, and knowledge of any applicant. 10 In addi-
tion, the Board is empowered to make and enforce such rules as
3. Id. 37:1451.
4. Id. 37:1437.
5. Sheppard v. Hulseberg, 171 La. 659, 131 So. 840 (1930).
6. LA. R.S. 37:1458 (1950).
7. Id. 37:1450; Trentman Co. v. Brown, 176 La. 854, 147 So. 14 (1933) (hold-
ing that a broker who negotiates a purchase or sale of real estate before comply-
ing with the terms of the licensing statute, and who subsequently does so comply
before claiming a commission, cannot recover) ; Bergeron v. Mumphrey, 38 So.2d
411 (La. App. 1949) ; Mathews-Pelton, Inc. v. LeBlanc, 126 So. 449 (La. App.
1930) (the fact that a real estate broker, properly licensed, secured the assistance
of a third person in procuring an offer to purchase property, such third person not
being a licensed real estate salesman, did not preclude the broker from recovering
a commission) ; Levy v. Maher, 4 La. App. 600 (1926) ; Bosetta v. Jacobs, 1 La.
App. 277 (1924) (a licensed real estate broker was not refused access to the
courts to enforce a claim for compensation where he had agreed to divide the com-
mission with one not a licensed broker or salesman in return for that person's
services in procuring a purchaser).
8. LA. R.S. 37:1438(A) (2) (1950).




are necessary to administer and enforce the statutory provi-
sions,1 and to revoke or suspend licenses for any of the reasons
enumerated in the statutes.12
"Real Estate" as Contemplated by the Statutes
The courts have generally had little difficulty in deciding
what constitutes real estate within the contemplation of the
statutes. However, the cases involving sales or leases of min-
erals and standing timber have given rise to troublesome prob-
lems."3 Prior to 1953, the Louisiana courts refused to include
the sale of standing timber within the scope of the statutory
provisions regulating real estate brokerage, 1 4 even though stand-
ing timber had been expressly made a separate immovable es-
tate.15 In that year, the Louisiana Supreme Court overruled the
previous jurisprudence's and declared the sale or lease of stand-
ing timber to be subject to the regulatory provisions governing
real estate brokers. 1 7 The purchase or sale of mineral leases,
however, has been considered as not falling within the scope of
the brokerage statutes.' 8 It was established in 1925 by the de-
cision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Vander Sluys v. Fin-
frock"'9 that the sale of oil and gas leases is not a sale of real
estate. On two subsequent occasions, 20 the court not only re-
affirmed its position but enlarged the area to be excluded from
the brokerage regulations. The first of these cases, Stanford v.
Bischoff,2" followed on the heels of the Vander Sluys decision,
and it was there said that in addition to the exclusion of min-
eral leases, the sale or purchase of ordinary leases did not fall
11. Id. 37:1436.
12. Id. 37:1454, as amended, La. Acts 1956, No. 556, § 10.
13. Ranger Land Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 224 La. 153, 68 So.2d
907 (1953) (standing timber) ; Cleaton v. Dowling, 164 La. 46, 113 So. 759
(1927) ; Gonzales v. Watson, 162 La. 1048, 111 So. 416 (1927) (minerals) ; Stan-
ford v. Bischoff, 159 La. 892, 106 So. 371 (1925) ; Van Sluys v. Finfrock, 158 La.
175, 103 So. 730 (1925).
14. LA. R.S. 37:1431 et 8eq. (1950) ; Cleaton v. Dowling, 164 La. 46, 113 So.
759 (1927).
15. La. Acts 1904, No. 188, p. 420.
16. Cleaton v. Dowling, 164 La. 46, 113 So. 759 (1927).
17. Ranger Land Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 224 La. 153, 68 So.2d
907 (1953).
18. Gonzales v. Watson, 162 La. 1048, 111 So. 416 (1927) ; Stanford v. Bis-
choff, 159 La. 892, 106 So. 371 (1925) ; Vander Sluys v. Finfrock, 158 La. 175,
103 So. 730 (1925). Cf. Op. LA. ATTY. GEN. 1922-24, p. 1010.
19. 158 La. 175, 103 So. 730 (1925).
20. Gonzales v. Watson, 162 La. 1048, 111 So. 416 (1927) ; Stanford v. Bis-
choff, 159 La. 892, 106 So. 371 (1925).
21. 159 La. 892, 106 So. 371 (1925).
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within the contemplation of the provisions. The court in that
case refused to classify the lease involved as an oil lease or as
an "ordinary" lease, but stated that it made no difference be-
cause the licensing provision defining real estate brokers made
no provision for the sale or purchase of leases, and hence was
not intended to include those transactions. The court took special
notice of the language of the statute, which includes "leases or
offers to lease," and stated that since it is a regulatory and re-
strictive statute, it should be strictly construed. Two years later,
in Gonzales v. Watson,22 the court, citing the Vander Sluys case
as authority, held that the procuration of gravel leases was in-
cluded in the exception. These decisions are the only ones in
this area of the brokerage regulations and it is to be presumed
that the distinctions drawn will be followed. It is highly doubtful
that the passage of an act in 1938,23 declaring mineral leases to
be real rights and incorporeal immovable property, has had any
effect upon those distinctions, for the classification set forth in
that act was expressly recognized by the court in the Vander
Sluys case.
Listings
The agreement between the principal, or landowner, and the
broker is called, in real estate brokerage parlance, a "listing,"
of which there are three types commonly used: exclusive listing,
exclusive agency, and open listing.
Under an exclusive listing of property to be sold, the broker
is entitled, in the absence of fraud or fault on his part, to a com-
mission on any contract of sale or contract to sell effected during
the period of the listing.24
22. 162 La. 1048, 111 So. 416 (1927).
23. La. Acts 1938, No. 205, p. 491.
24. The exclusive listing was defined in O'Neal v. Southland Lumber Co., 168
La. 235, 121 So. 755 (1929), as an "exclusive right to sell," thereby depriving
even the owner of the right to sell during the specified period without incurring
liability for the broker's commission. In the absence of any specified termination
date, the principal must revoke the listing prior to effecting personally a sale, in
order to avoid liability to the broker. Swearingen v. Maynard, 9 So.2d 272 (La.
App. 1942); Harvey v. Sehrt, 126 So. 568 (La. App. 1930); Connelly v. Rich-
mond, 119 So. 286 (La. App. 1928). It was held in Harvey v. Benson, 198 So.
183 (La. App. 1940), that proof that notice of revocation of a listing was de-
posited, properly addressed, in the United States mail creates a presumption that
the notice was received by the broker, and the presumption is sufficient to termi-
nate the listing contract in absence of satisfactory proof that it was not in fact
received.
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In addition to a stipulation regarding the duration of the
listing, many listing agreements now contain additional clauses
which protect, for a specified period following termination of
the listing, the broker's claim for a commission. In the event of
a sale to one originally procured by the broker during the period
of the listing, the effect of such a clause is to preserve, for the
additional period, the rights of the broker.25
Some exclusive listing agreements contain a stipulation that
the principal is to refer all prospective vendees to the broker. If
the principal, without the knowledge of the broker, sells or con-
tracts to sell to one who contacted him during the course of the
listing, the broker is entitled to recover the agreed commission. 26
Paradoxically, it was held in one instance that where the owner
merely granted an option during the life of the broker's listing,
and the option was exercised after the expiration of the stipu-
lated time during which the broker was protected, the broker
was not entitled to recover.2 7
An exclusive agency listing differs from an exclusive listing
agreement in only one material respect. Whereas, in an exclusive
listing, a broker is entitled to a commission on any sale made
during the listing, under an exclusive agency the principal is
privileged personally to sell without incurring liability for the
broker's commission. 28  With this exception, the rights of the
25. Tharpe v. Tracy, 47 So.2d 336 (La. App. 1950) (agreement between
broker and principal to terminate listing did not affect stipulation that broker
was to be entitled to a commission upon any sale made within six months after
termination to a purchaser procured by the broker during the listing) ; Ruiz v.
Kiehm's Pharmacy, 37 So.2d 720 (La. App. 1948) (sale by principal to pur-
chaser contacted by broker during listing; even though a sale is made to one
procured originally by the broker during the listing, if it is effected after the
additional protective period, the broker cannot recover) ; Gardner v. Fonseca, 85
So.2d 524 (La. App. 1956). Cf. Alex Dreyfus Co. v. Breen, 126 So. 264 (La.
App. 1930) (sale within specified period to one procured by broker during listing,
but on terms different from that which the broker was authorized to accept-no
recovery). The broker is also protected with regard to executory contracts formed
during the additional period. Caruso-Goll v. La Nasa, 72 So.2d 13 (La. App.
1954) ; Harvey v. Riedlinger, 17 So.2d 60 (La. App. 1944) ; Zollinger v. Gust,
192 So. 132 (La. App. 1939).
26. Doll v. Thornhill, 6 So.2d 793 (La. App. 1942).
27. Milling v. Succession of Barrow, 170 La. 697, 129 So. 134 (1930) arose
upon a rather unique listing. Plaintiff was granted an exclusive listing for the
sale of a canal, the listing to be in effect for five years. The option was granted
only one month before the termination of the listing, and the court stated that,
after five years, the plaintiff's injury was too speculative in nature to be de-
serving of recovery.
28. O'Neal v. Southland Lumber Co., 168 La. 235, 121 So. 755, (1929) : "There
is a marked difference between the appointment of an exclusive agent to sell real
estate and the granting of the exclusive right to such agent to sell during a fixed
period. This is recognized in 9 Corpus Juris, p. 622; 'Where, however, the broker
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broker under an exclusive agency listing are determined just as
they are under the exclusive listing.
Under an open listing, no restrictions are placed upon the
principal regarding his privilege of acting through other brokers
or effecting the sale personally. The rights of the broker to a
commission are limited to a sale made to a purchaser procured by
the broker's efforts; that is, he must be the "procuring cause"
of the sale.2
9
The Nature of the Contract
It is highly unlikely that a real estate broker and landowner
in agreeing on a listing consider whether the agreement proposes
the formation of a bilateral or a unilateral contract. The deter-
mination of the true nature of the agreement will in most cases
not be required. However, such determination may become im-
portant if the owner undertakes to withdraw the authority of
the broker prior to the expiration of the stipulated period. Where
the broker has spent time, effort, and money in the furtherance
of the purpose of the listing, it will be manifestly unjust to allow
the landowner to deprive him of the opportunity of being suc-
cessful by an untimely withdrawal of the listing. Some courts,
in an effort to support a holding that a withdrawal under such
circumstances is ineffective, have taken the view that the listing
served to create a bilateral contract containing an implied
promise by the broker to use due diligence to find a purchaser.30
Other courts have simply concluded that the promise of the
owner to pay the stipulated commission becomes irrevocable after
partial performance on the part of the broker.3 1 Whatever view
is taken, there is general agreement that there is no privilege
of revocation after the broker has expended time, effort, and
money in undertaking to find a purchaser. No case has been
found in which the owner has received damages from the broker
because of the latter's failure to do anything in furtherance of
the listing. In such an event, the owner will be adequately pro-
is given merely an exclusive agency, as distinguished from an exclusive right to
sell, it merely precludes the principal from employing another broker, and does
not preclude him from making a sale himself without the broker's aid, and in such
a case he will not be liable to the broker for commission.' "
29. See note 38 infra.
30. Braniff v. Baler, 101 Kan. 117, 165 Pac. 816, L.R.A. 1917, 1036 (1917);
Mercantile Trust Co. v. Lamar, 148 Mo. App. 353, 128 S.W. 20 (1910).
31. Breard v. Kanelos, 49 So.2d 451 (La. App. 1950) ; Bell v. Dimmerling, 149
Ohio St. 165, 78 N.E.2d 49 (1948).
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tected by simply allowing him to cancel the listing. Under either
analysis, this should be legally permissible.32
Broker's Right to Compensation
In Louisiana, it is established that the authority given to an
agent or broker to sell or contract to sell immovable property
belonging to the principal must be given in writing. 8 If such
authority is given only verbally, it seems that the broker will
not be allowed to recover. 8 4 On the other hand, if the broker is
merely to procure a purchaser, with whom the principal will him-
self conclude the contract, the brokerage agreement may be
verbal.3 5
The listing agreement may stipulate that the broker is to be
paid a commission for finding a purchaser ready, willing, and
able to buy, or it may stipulate that the broker is to be paid a
commission only upon the actual sale of the property. If the
broker satisfies the requirements of the listing, he is entitled
to the agreed commission. If he fails to satisfy the listing re-
quirements, he may still be entitled to compensation if he can
bring himself within the procuring cause theory. A great num-
ber of the decisions involving the rights of brokers to compensa-
tion are based on that theory,3 6 which generally refers to "the
efforts of the broker in introducing, producing, finding, and in-
teresting" a purchaser.3 7 It is an accepted rule that a broker is
entitled to recover a commission if he can prove that he was the
procuring cause of a transaction that was within the terms of
the brokerage agreement and which occurred either within the
stipulated period, or in the absence thereof, within a reasonable
time after his negotiations with the purchaser had ceased. 8 On
32. For a detailed discussion of the different views, see 1 CORaIN, CONTRACTS
§ 50 (1950), and cases cited therein.
33. Whatley v. McMillan, 152 La. 978, 94 So. 905 (1922): "[A]greements
purporting to transfer, incumber, or otherwise affect real estate must be in
writing."
34. Treadaway v. Giangrosso, 16 So.2d 677 (La. App. 1944).
35. Kernaghan & Cordill v. Uthoff, 174 La. 880, 141 So. 865 (1932) (broker
allowed to establish by parol evidence a verbal contract); Isaac v. Dronet, 31
So.2d 299 (La. App. 1947) ; Lally v. Dossat, 31 So.2d 41 (La. App. 1947) ; Isaac
v. Calcasieu Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 139 So. 490 (La. App. 1932) ; Whatley v. Mc-
Millan, 152 La. 978, 94 So. 905 (1922).
36. The term "procuring cause" is used extensively in litigation concerning
real estate brokers' claims for compensation. It is defined in BLACK, LAW DIc-
TIONARY (4th ed. 1951) as "approximate cause."
37. Foulks v. Richardson, 87 So.2d 335, 337 (La. App. 1956).
38. Meyers v. Meraux, 169 La. 712, 125 So. 864 (1930) ; Bullis & Thomas v.
Calvert, 162 La. 378, 110 So. 621 (1926) ; Freeman & Freeman v. Torre Realty
[Vol. XVII
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the other hand, if the listing agreement contains a stipulation
that the broker is to be entitled to a commission upon any sale
effected during a specified period following the termination of
the listing, the broker cannot recover on any sale made after
the expiration of that period irrespective of whether the sale
was to a purchaser originally procured by the broker.8 9 The
broker, in order to be considered the procuring cause of a trans-
action, must show that the negotiations which eventually led to
the conveyance were the result of some active effort on his
part.4 0 However, the courts have been very liberal in finding
the necessary exertion by the broker. The mere introduction of
a prospective vendee to the principal may be sufficient "active
effort" to make the broker the procuring cause in the event that
a sale i ultimately consummated with that vendee.41 This is
true, even if the introduction was accomplished solely as a re-
sult of advertisements placed by the broker, but in such a case
the broker must prove that the purchaser contacted the prin-
cipal as a result of the advertisement. 42 A recent case exemplify-
ing the application of the procuring cause theory is Dew v.
Hunter.48 In that case a broker exhibited the property subject
to the listing to the fiancee of the purchaser. The court held
& Improvement Co., 157 La. 1093, 103 So. 334 (1925) ; Wright v. Monsour, 86
So.2d 586 (La. App. 1956) ; Womack Agencies, Inc. v. Fisher, 86 So.2d 732 (La.
App. 1956) ; Corbitt v. Robinson, 53 So.2d 259 (La. App. 1951) ; Ramsey v. Harry
Bros. Co., 11 So.2d 256 (La. App. 1942); Gristina v. Nunez, 8 La. App. 531
(1928).
39. Gardner v. Fonseca, 85 So.2d 524 (La. App. 1956).
40. Latter & Blum, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 208 La. 490, 23 So.2d
193 (1945) ; Freeman & Freeman v. Torre Realty & Improvement Co., 157 La.
1093, 103 So. 334 (1925) ; Foulks v. Richardson, 87 So.2d 335 (La. App. 1956) ;
Dew v. Hunter, 66 So.2d 400 (La. App. 1953) ; Doll v. Untz, 57 So.2d 55 (La.
App. 1952) ; Corbitt v. Robinson, 53 So.2d 259 (La. App. 1951) ; Lawrence v.
Bailey, 41 So.2d 474 (La. App. 1949) ; Jeter & Monroe v. Daniels, 25 So.2d 911
(La. App. 1946) ; White v. Havard, 25 So.2d 108 (La. App. 1946); Sollie v.
Peoples' Bank & Trust Co., 194 So. 116 (La. App. 1940) ; Wolf v. Casamento,
185 So. 537 (La. App. 1939) ; Viguerie v. Mathes, 120 So. 542 (La. App. 1929).
Cf. where the broker was found not to be the procuring cause of the transaction:
Gardner v. Fonseca, 85 So.2d 524 (La. App. 1956) ; Albritton v. Bosworth, 64
So.2d 462 (La. App. 1953) ; Cobb v. Saucier, 30 So.2d 784 (La. App. 1947);
Myevre v. Davila, 10 So.2d 119 (La. App. 1942) ; Gamblin v. Young, 187 So. 854
(La. App. 1939) ; Isaac v. Calcasieu Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 139 So. 490 (La. App.
1932) ; Turner v. Swann, 124 So. 717 (La. App. 1929) ; Wittenberg v. McGrath,
3 La. App. 244 (1925) ; Taylor v. Martin, 33 So. 112 (La. App. 1902).
41. Sollie v. Peoples' Bank & Trust Co., 194 So. 116 (La. App. 1940). Cf.
Myevre v. Davila, 10 So.2d 119 (La. App. 1942), where prospective purchaser
read owner's ad and upon being told that the plaintiff had the listing (open),
sought out the plaintiff, requested to be taken to see the owner, and subsequently
consummated the sale without the aid of the broker. The court there stated that
the broker had not provoked the introduction nor in any manner brought it about;
consequently he was not entitled to a commission.
42. Isaac v. Calcasieu Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 139 So. 490 (La. App. 1932).
43. 66 So.2d 400 (La. App. 1953).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVII
that, since the man to whose fiancee the broker had shown the
property would not otherwise have purchased it, the broker was
entitled to compensation.
In the rare instances in which the listing has no specified
time limitation, it may be terminated by the principal if the
broker fails to procure a purchaser within a reasonable period
of time.44 Whether it can be terminated before a reasonable time
is subject to much doubt.45  Following such termination, the
broker acquires no right to a commission, even though a sale is
made to a customer originally contacted by the broker and
despite the fact that the broker's efforts might have materially
influenced the sale.40 It is to be noted that this is a limitation
of the general rule of procuring cause.
A principal and his broker are under mutual obligations to
exercise good faith in their relationship.47 If the principal, with-
out legal cause, breaches an executory contract in which the
broker has a compensable interest, or arbitrarily refuses to sell
to a purchaser procured by the broker, the principal is deemed
guilty of a breach of good faith and can be held liable for the
broker's commission. 48 Where the principal is unable to com-
44. Lewis v. Manson, 132 La. 817, 61 So. 835 (1913) ; Clesi v. D'Angelo, 5
La. App. 432 (1926).
45. Comments, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVmEw 131 (1951), 2 LOuISuiNA LAW
REWIEW 182 (1938).
46. Lewis v. Manson, 132 La. 817, 61 So. 835 (1913).
47. LA. CIVIL CoDE arts. 3002-3026 (1870) ; Wright v. Monsour, 86 So.2d 586
(La. App. 1956) (principal took negotiations into own hands and completed at
lesser price, recovery allowed) ; Adair v. Fleming, 68 So.2d 215 (La. App. 1953)
(principal conveyed to third person who, under pre-arranged plan, conveyed to
purchaser procured by broker, recovery allowed) ; Corbitt v. Robinson, 53 So.2d
259 (La. App. 1951) (principal, without the knowledge of broker who was pro-
curing cause, completed sale at lower price, recovery allowed) ; Boone v. David,
52 So.2d 563 (La. App. 1951) (principal voluntarily released purchaser from
contract to sell, recovery allowed) ; Lawrence v. Bailey, 41 So.2d 474 (La. App.
1949) (principal attempted to deprive broker of commission by effecting personal
sale, recovery allowed); White v. I-avard, 25 So.2d 108 (La. App. 1946) (prin-
cipal terminated broker's listing at time when principal was in negotiations with
prospective purchaser procured by the broker, recovery allowed); Lestrade v.
Perera, 6 La. Ann. 398 (1851) (principal refused to sell to purchaser procured
by broker, then later effected sale to same purchaser, recovery allowed). In As-
sunto v. Coleman, 104 So. 318 (La. App. 1925), the broker acquired an interest
in property adverse to the interest of his principal. The court there held that
the broker must be considered as holding the interest as constructive trustee for
the principal. A broker was denied recovery in Rhodes & Symes v. Nadeski, 119
So. 292 (La. App. 1928), because he allowed a prospective purchaser to withdraw
a deposit, in violation of a clause in the brokerage agreement.
48. Treadaway v. Amundson, 88 So.2d 67 (La. App. 1956) (sale not con-
summated because of outstanding adverse mineral interest on principal's prop-
erty, therefore unable to convey merchantable title) ; Cox v. Green, 70 So.2d 724
(La. App. 1954) (principal listed property which she had received as donation
from ex-husband, who refused to join in conveyance, and purchaser refused to
COMMENTS
plete the sale because of a pre-existing title defect of which the
broker had no notice, the courts have held that the broker is
entitled to receive his commission. 49 The principal cannot, how-
ever, be held liable to his broker for his failure to consummate
a contract to sell if the failure to do so is caused by a title de-
fect arising subsequent to the formation of an executory contract
and through no fault of the principal.50 In such a case the broker
has been awarded recovery of the "out-of-pocket" expenseswhich
he had incurred in procuring a purchaser.5 1 The court did not
adequately explain the reason or justification for granting re-
covery of such expenses but it probably rests on the idea that
it would simply be unjust to make the broker bear that loss.
A broker's obligations differ from those of an ordinary agent
in that the broker is the agent of both his principal and third
persons with whom negotations are pursued.52 Consequently, a
broker must deal in good faith with both parties to the negotia-
tions. It has been held that a prospective purchaser who is
pecuniarily injured through the failure of a broker to transmit
the prospect's offer to the principal can recover damages from
the broker. 5  However, it is not bad faith on the part of the
broker if he fails to reveal to a prospective purchaser that there
are outstanding encumbrances on the property to be conveyed,
even though the property is to be conveyed free of all encum-
brances.54 A broker has the right to assume that his principal
accept such title) ; Boone v. David, 52 So.2d 563 (La. App. 1951) (principal
entered into contract to qell, then voluntarily released purchaser from the agree-
ment) ; Doll v. Russo, 7 So.2d 406 (La. App. 1942) (defective title) ; Caruso-Goll
v. D'Alphonso, 1 So.2d 120 (La. App. 1941) (defective title) ; Neal v. Murff, 133
So. 418 (La. App. 1931) (principal refused to execute agreement to exchange
property) ; Levistones v. Landreaux, 6 La. Ann. 26 (La. App. 1851) (principal
voluntarily released purchaser procured by broker, then sold to another).
49. Mathews Bros. v. Bernius, 169 La. 1069, 126 So. 556 (1930) ; Veters v.
Walsh, 124 So. 687 (La. App. 1929).
50. Cabral v. Barkerding, 50 So.2d 516 (La. App. 1951) (vendor unable to
consummate contract of sale because subsequent to the contract to sell wife
recorded declaration that the property to be sold constituted the family homestead
and refused to join in the conveyance) ; Neal v. Halliburton, 19 So.2d 625 (La.
App. 1944) (recordation by wife of homestead declaration).
51. Blackshear v. Landey, 46 So.2d 688 (La. App. 1950).
52. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3017 (1870) ; Martin v. Fontenot, 27 So.2d 457 (La.
App. 1946) ; Dumaine & Co. v. Gay, Sullivan & Co., 188 So. 163 (La. App. 1939)
(broker engaged in selling sugar, but same. rules are applicable) ; S. Pfeiffer &
Co. v. Mayer & Co., 3 La. App. 289 (1925).
53. Amato v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 227 La. 537, 79 So.2d 873 (1955). The
court, in that case, based its decision upon LA. R.S. 37:1447 (1950), which allows
anyone injured by a broker through fraud, misrepresentation, or wrongful acts to
sue for recovery of damages.
54. Spiro v. Corliss, 174 So. 285 (La. App. 1937).
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has some means of satisfying existing mortgages.55
The executory contract of sale between principal and third
person frequently contains a clause stating that a breach thereof
will impose liability for the broker's commission upon the breach-
ing party. That stipulation gives to the broker, in the event of
a breach of the contract by the purchaser, a right of action
against the purchaser for the stated commission.58 However, if
an executory contract is not executed because of some fault or
mistake on the part of the broker, the broker has no right to
demand compensation from either party.5 7 A violation of the
terms of the listing agreement operates as a forfeiture of the
broker's right to a commission.58 Furthermore, the principal is
not bound by acts done beyond the scope of the broker's au-
thority.5 9
The Quantum of the Broker's Recovery
It is stated in the Civil Code that a mandate or procuration
is gratuitous unless there has been an agreement to the con-
trary.60 However, the courts have generally not applied the ar-
ticles on mandate"' to contracts whereby one procures a real
estate broker to act in his capacity as a broker.62 In the few
55. Ibid.
56. Roe v. Maniscalco, 174 La. 526, 141 So. 49 (1932) (the purchaser, Dot
being chargeable with violating the executory contract, was not held liable for
the broker's commission) ; Caruso-Goll v. DeFelice, 72 So.2d 778 (La. App. 1954)
(the neglect of the broker released the purchaser from the obligation to pay the
broker's commission) ; Dane & Northrup v. Selzer, 63 So.2d 760 (La. App. 1953) ;
Blache v. Goodier, 22 So.2d 82 (La. App. 1945) ; Matthews-Pelton, Inc., v. Le-
Blanc, 126 So. 449 (La. App. 1930) ; McWilliams v. Stackhouse, 1 La. App. 25a
(1924).
57. LA. CIVTL CODE art. 3022 (1870) ; Caruso-Goll v. DeFelice, 72 So.2d 778
(La. App. 1954) (failure to give client notification within a reasonable time of
the principal's acceptance of the offer to purchase) ; Ernest A. Carrere's Sons v.
Rumore, 52 So.2d 57 (La. App. 1951) (through mistake of broker, printed form
sent to vendor for signature varied in terms from printed form signed by pur-
chaser) ; Villemeur v. Woodward, 134 So. 111 (La. App. 1931) (broker failed to
obtain owner's signature to acceptance of offer to purchase).
58. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3022 (1870) ; Canovsky v. Bonhage, 126 So. 252 (La.
App. 1930) ; Rhodes & Symes v. Nadeski, 119 So. 292 (La. App. 1928).
59. LA. CivIL CODE arts. 3010, 3021 (1870) ; Blythe v. Hall, 169 La. 1120,
126 So. 679 (1930).
60. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2991 (1870).
61. Id. art. 2985 et 8eq.
62. Sugar Field Oil Co. v. Carter, 214 La. 586, 38 So.2d 249 (1949) (no
agreement regarding commission, broker allowed recovery of commission on sum
paid for option) ; Doll v. Weiblen Marble & Granite Co., 207 La. 769, 22 So.2d
59 (1945) (Civil Code Article 2991, which says mandate is gratuitous unless
otherwise provided, expressly held inapplicable to determine principal's liability to
broker); Richardson v. Bradford, 153 La. 725, 96 So. 546 (1923) (expressly
stated that an exclusive listing of real estate is not governed by law of mandate,
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instances in which no express agreement was made regarding
the compensation of the broker, the courts have usually awarded
compensation customary in the locale in which the broker prac-
tices,6 but no uniform rationale has been formulated.04 The re-
sult is just, for it is highly unlikely that any person would ex-
pect that one who performs brokerage services as a vocation
would enter into a contract for the rendition of those services
gratuitously.
If the broker is employed under an exclusive listing to sell
property at a fixed price for a stipulated commission, and the
principal concludes a sale at a lesser price, the majority of cases
have held that the broker is entitled only to a ratable proportion
of the promised commission.65 However, it has also been held
that the broker is entitled to recover the full amount of the com-
pensation as agreed upon in the listing agreement. 6
The expenses which the broker incurs in the performance of
his services are generally to be assumed by the broker. However,
reimbursement for certain expenses has been allowed in the re-
cent case of Blackshear v. Landey, 7 in which a sale could not
be consummated through no fault on the part of the principal. In
that case, as mentioned previously, the principal's wife, subse-
quent to the formation of the executory contract, had recorded
an instrument designating the real estate listed with the broker
and does not expire with the death of the principal, but only at the stated time)
Craton v. Inabnett, 62 So.2d 129 (La. App. 1952) (no agreement as to commis-
sion; court found implied obligation to pay based on past services); Lally v.
Dossat, 31 So.2d 41 (La. App. 1947) (brokerage contract considered as a con-
tract of employment). Contra: Knotts v. Midkiff, 114 La. 234, 38 So. 153 (1905) ;
Duncan Steele, Inc. v. Labatt, 130 So. 841 (La. App. 1930). However, it is in-
cumbent upon the broker to prove the existence of a brokerage agreement between
himself and his principal in order to recover: Moore v. Loe, 37 So.2d 345 (La.
App. 1948) ; United States Realty Sales v. Rhodes, 34 So.2d 523 (La. App. 1948) ;
Doiron v. Woodruff, 23 So.2d 366 (La. App. 1945) ; Doll v. Firemen's Charitable
& Benevolent Ass'n, 8 So.2d 156 (La. App. 1942).
63. Mobley-Rosenthal v. Weiss, 152 So. 589 (La. App. 1934) (customary com-
mission awarded, seemingly on theory of unjust enrichment).
64. Sugar Field Oil Co. v. Carter, 214 La. 586, 38 So.2d 249 (1949) (re-
covery allowed on basis of quantum meruit) ; Doll v. Weiblen Marble & Granite
Co., 207 La. 769, 22 So.2d 59 (1945) (recovery allowed on basis of equitable
principle set forth in Civil Code Article 1965) ; Craton v. Inabnett, 62 So.2d 129
(La. App. 1952) (implied obligation found by court in light of previous dealings).
65. J. R. Grand Agency v. Staring, 156 La. 1094, 101 So. 723 (1924)-; Grace
Realty v. Peytavin Planting Co., 156 La. 93, 100 So. 62, 43 A.L.R. 1096 (1924) ;
Foulks v. Richardson, 87 So.2d 335 (La. App. 1956) ; Dew v. Hunter, 66 So.2d
400 (La. App. 1953); Moore v. Walther, 66 So.2d 403 (La. App. 1953) ; Corbitt
v. Robinson, 53 So.2d 259 (La. App. 1951) ; Jeter & Monroe v. Daniels, 25 So.2d
911 (La. App. 1946); Myevre v. Norton, 6 So.2d 215 (La. App. 1942).
66. Lawrence v. Bailey, 41 So.2d 474 (La. App. 1949).
67. 46 So.2d 688 (La. App. 1950).
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as the family homestead.6 8 The court, in allowing recovery in
that case, cited as authority an earlier decision of the Louisiana
Supreme Court which had, in similar circumstances, allowed re-
covery of expenses by the prospective vendee.0 9 The court, in the
Blackshear case, limited the recovery to "out-of-pocket" expenses
incurred in advertising the property for sale. Although this
limitation may seem unjust in some instances, the administra-
tive factor involved might well have influenced the decision. If
the courts were to open their doors to claims for expenses less
susceptible of proof, the result might seriously impair the rights
of faultless principals by subjecting them to ill-founded claims.
It is well established in this state that attorneys' fees are
not recoverable unless they are expressly stipulated for in the
contract or unless they are specially authorized by law.70 Since
there is no such statutory authority applicable to brokers' claims
for compensation, it has become a general practice for the broker
to insert into the listing agreement a clause imposing liability
upon the principal for attorneys' fees incurred by the broker in
the prosecution of a suit to recover compensation pursuant to
the agreement.
James L. Pelletier
68. La. Acts 1921, No. 35, p. 38, allows the wife of a vendor to record an
instrument designating real property as the family homestead, and thereafter it
cannot be sold without her consent. This recordation, even after an agreement
between the vendor and vendee as to the price and thing, is sufficient to prevent
conveyance of the property if it is recorded before delivery of the deed and receipt
of the price. Neal v. Halliburton, 19 So.2d 625 (La. App. 1944). The earlier
cases held the broker not entitled to recover any expenses: Blanc v. New Orleans
Improvement & Banking Co., 2 Rob. 63 (La. 1842) ; Didion v. Duralde, 2 Rob.
163 (La. 1842). In Hoggatt v. John, 185 La. 227, 169 So. 69 (1936), the court
disallowed a claim for expenses incurred in surveying the property pursuant to a
request by a prospective purchaser. On the other hand, the broker has been
awarded expenses where he acquired an interest in the property adverse to the
interest of his principal. The court ruled that the broker held the property as
constructive trustee for the principal, but allowed the broker to recover expenses
incurred in preserving the property. See also Assunto v. Coleman, 158 La. 537,
104 So. 318 (1925).
69. Baumann v. Michel, 190 La. 1, 181 So. 549 (1938).
70. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1934(2) (1870); Womack Agencies v. Fisher, 86
So.2d 732 (La. App. 1956) ; Blackshear v. Landey, 46 So.2d 688 (La. App. 1950).
Recovery of attorneys' fees was allowed in Matthews-Pelton, Inc. v. LeBlanc, 126
So. 449 (La. App. 1930), where there was specific provision made in the contract
for the payment of such fees.
